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DEFERENCE VS. EVIDENCE: AN EXPLORATION OF 
THE APPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF PUTATIVE 
BENEFITS TO THE PIKE BALANCING TEST 
Nathan Gniewek+ 
Almost anyone, regardless of the degree to which he participates in the legal 
field, can recognize a depiction of Lady Justice.  Despite her blindfold, she 
stands her ground confidently, holding her scales high.  Her scales have long 
symbolized a kind of ideal in law: the impartial weighing of facts to render a 
decision.  The average person often comes to depend on those very decisions, 
believing the scales of Lady Justice to be well-calibrated and the results 
therefrom to be consistent, trustworthy, and reliable.  Sadly, that ideal is not 
always attainable.  One example of a failure to achieve legal stability and 
consistency is evident in the realm of dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence—specifically, in the use of the Supreme Court’s Pike balancing 
test. 
The “dormant” Commerce Clause—an inferential concept derived from the 
U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause—has existed in some ethereal form since 
the early republic.1  The dormant Commerce Clause is the idea that Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce precludes, at least to some extent, the 
power of the states to do the same.2  This judicial doctrine—used to determine 
the constitutionality of state laws regulating or affecting interstate commerce—
has evolved in fits and starts throughout the Supreme Court’s history.3  In its 
more modern jurisprudence, the Court has developed various tests to determine 
the constitutionality of state laws that have an impact on interstate commerce in 
some form or fashion. 
One of the most famous frameworks is the Pike balancing test.  The Pike test 
requires a court to weigh the burdens that a state law places on interstate 
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Candidate, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2019.  I dedicate this work 
to my beloved late grandfathers, Felix Gniewek and Roman Welyczko, whose undying love for 
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       “Fiat justitia, ruat caelum.” 
 1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 2. See Town of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)) (stating that the dormant 
Commerce Clause “limits the power of local governments to enact laws affecting interstate 
commerce”). 
 3. Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate 
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 571–72 (1997). 
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commerce against the law’s “putative local benefits.”4  The major problem with 
Pike balancing, however, is that the Supreme Court has left the term “putative 
benefits” largely undefined.  The lack of a definition has led to one of the 
longest-lived circuit splits in American legal history.  Some federal circuit courts 
have attempted to rectify the lack of a solid definition of “putative benefits” by 
accepting a state’s assertion concerning the alleged benefits of the law in 
question, largely out of respect for state sovereignty and overall deference to the 
legislature.5  Other circuit courts have required substantive proof of the alleged 
benefits of a state’s law, thereby placing the state’s local interests under greater 
scrutiny.6  For example, these circuit courts often require the state to produce 
evidence that the alleged benefits will, in fact, come to pass.7  Until this circuit 
split is resolved, states are left in the dark—they are left to wonder what they 
should expect when courts examine their laws using the Pike test.  Additionally, 
because of the different approaches taken by their respective circuit courts, the 
various states will adopt differing legislation to attempt to comply with the 
different standards. 
The uncertainty that this circuit split generates has real-world consequences.  
This is not just some purely hypothetical or academic exercise.  So long as this 
circuit split remains unresolved and states cannot properly anticipate what 
treatment their laws will receive, the businesses, corporations, and other 
economic entities within them will also remain in a state of regulatory limbo.  If 
states’ abilities to regulate their economic affairs remain hampered in this way, 
the American people employed at businesses both large and small may also be 
adversely affected.  In a time where jobs and economic well-being are among 
the average person’s top concerns, settling this circuit split is of utmost 
importance.8 This Comment offers a resolution to the “dormant” Commerce 
Clause circuit split based on the more deferential approach.  It proceeds as 
follows: Part I briefly explains and presents the Pike test, and fleshes out the 
current circuit split and various approaches taken in examining state putative 
benefits during the application of the Pike test.  Part II examines the approaches 
that the circuits have employed, assessing and critiquing them.  Part III draws 
                                               
 4. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 5. James D. Fox, State Benefits Under the Pike Balancing Test of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: Putative or Actual?, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 175, 199–202 (2003) (describing the various 
approaches to the scrutiny used by each of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, including 
those that have given great deference to state legislatures). 
 6. Id. at 202–03. 
 7. See, e.g., R & M Oil & Supply, Inc. v. Saunders, 307 F.3d 731, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 8. Heather Long, The unhappy states of America: Despite an improving economy, 
Americans are glum, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/30/the-unhappy-states-of-america-
despite-an-improving-economy-americans-are-glum/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a809f2f945c7 
(stating that “[i]n 2017, half of Americans said one of their top fears was ‘not having enough money 
for the future,’ a reminder that even if people have jobs now, they remain anxious because they 
aren’t sure how long that will last”). 
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several critical distinctions and teases out some of the nuances within the Pike 
test in support of the proposition that courts should take a more deferential 
posture when using the Pike balancing test.  Part III also offers support for the 
proposition that courts employing the more deferential posture have a more 
compelling basis in law for doing so than those taking a stricter approach.  
Additionally, Part III offers some suggestions for how to use and define 
“putative benefits.”  Finally, Part IV offers a brief conclusion. 
I. A HISTORICAL MAP: THE HIKE TO PIKE 
A. The Birth of Pike Balancing. 
One of the few things that has remained consistent throughout the Supreme 
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that the Court has 
maintained its status as “collaborator with Congress in the regulation of foreign 
and interstate commerce, . . . [which brings] before the Court questions 
inescapably implicating legislative policy.”9  Beginning with Chief Justice 
Marshall’s tenure, the Supreme Court struggled with how to perform dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis.10 
Then, in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the United States saw seismic economic 
changes.  The Roaring Twenties brought about an unprecedented technological 
and economic expansion, but only a few short years thereafter—following the 
collapse of the stock market toward the end of 1929—the United States found 
itself in the throes of the Great Depression.11  The subsequent election of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 began a new era in American history, ushering in 
                                               
 9. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND 
WAITE 21 (1964). 
 10. See, e.g., S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 195–96 (1938) 
(upholding a state law that prohibited certain trucks from using the state’s highways because the 
law was not discriminatory, the matter was one of local concern, and Congress had not passed a 
superseding statute); S. Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 532–34 (1910) (commenting that the 
constitutionality of certain state laws will turn on what effect they have on interstate commerce); 
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) (upholding a state law that concerned the regulation 
and licensing of locomotive engineers because the law affected interstate commerce only 
incidentally and did not conflict with an act of Congress); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 
(1875) (stressing that matters of a national nature or those requiring uniform regulation are outside 
the power of regulation by states and holding unconstitutional—despite the absence of a particular 
federal law on the matter—a Missouri law that taxed certain goods that were not produced in the 
state); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 299–300 (1851) (upholding a state pilotage law 
because Congress had remained silent on the matter); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 
U.S. 245, 252 (1829) (validating a state act that permitted building of a dam restricting the use of a 
particular creek because the act did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause or conflict with any 
law of Congress); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 220–22 (1824) (holding that Congress’s power to 
regulate commerce preempted a New York law that granted two men exclusive privileges to operate 
steamboats within its navigable waters). 
 11. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL 
WELFARE IN AMERICA 273 (6th ed. 1999). 
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the rise of the modern administrative state, complete with an entire host of new 
economic programs and regulations in the form of the New Deal.12  The Supreme 
Court’s increasingly disjointed case law in the wake of such rapid growth in the 
regulatory power of government led to the adoption of “a methodology that 
persists to this day—a balancing of [a] State’s interest in enforcing a state 
regulation against the burden the regulation imposes on interstate commerce.”13  
These were the circumstances that set the stage for the development of the Pike 
balancing test. 
The United States Supreme Court decided Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.14 in 
1970.  Pike employed phraseology and reasoning similar to the terms and 
analytical approaches that the Court used in its opinions in several cases decided 
during the preceding decades, including cases such as Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,15 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,16 and Huron 
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit.17  Southern Pacific Co.—a case that concerned 
an Arizona law limiting the length of trains operating in the state—provided 
support for the Court’s emphasis on comparing state and national economic 
interests.18  The Court also borrowed the balancing aspect of Bibb,19 a case that 
addressed an Illinois law requiring certain rear fender mudguards to be affixed 
                                               
 12. Barry Cushman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920– ) 268, 268–69 (Michael 
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). 
 13. Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed 
Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 410–11 (1998).  See also Sam Kalen, 
Dormant Commerce Clause’s Aging Burden, 49 VAL. U.L. REV. 723, 763–64 (2015); see generally 
Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585 (1988) (providing an in-depth look 
at the nature and popularity of balancing tests). 
 14. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 15. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
 16. 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
 17. 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
 18. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 763. 
There has thus been left to the states wide scope for the regulation of matters of local 
state concern, even though it in some measure affects the commerce, provided it does not 
materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state lines, or interfere with it in 
matters with respect to which uniformity of regulation is of predominant national 
concern. 
Id. at 770.  “Here, examination of all the relevant factors makes it plain that the state interest is 
outweighed by the interest of the nation in an adequate, economical and efficient railway 
transportation service, which must prevail.”  Id. at 783–84. 
 19. Compare Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will 
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”), with Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529–30 (“This is one of those cases . . . where 
local safety measures that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce . . . .  [T]he present showing—balanced against the clear burden on commerce—is far 
too inconclusive to make this mudguard meet that test.”). 
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to trucks operating on state highways.20  Finally, the Court drew upon language 
concerning evenhanded regulation and legitimate local interests from Huron 
Portland Cement Co.,21 a case that concerned a Detroit law setting limits on 
smoke emissions from ships operating in interstate commerce.22 
Pike itself arose out of a dispute concerning an Arizona law that restricted the 
means through which cantaloupes could be sent to California for processing, 
thereby placing a strain on interstate commerce.23  The cantaloupe grower 
challenged the law because it forbade the company from shipping its goods out 
of state unless the company packaged the fruits in specified containers via means 
that could only be done in a packing shed.24  This was problematic for the 
grower, because it sent the fruits across state lines to California precisely 
because there were no such sheds available in Arizona.25  If the cantaloupe 
grower complied with the law, the company would have lost all of its cantaloupe 
crop from that year.26  The loss of that year’s cantaloupe crop would have cost 
the company about $700,000.27  The district court granted preliminary relief to 
                                               
 20. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 521–522. 
 21. Compare Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate 
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will 
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”), with Huron Portland Cement, 362 U.S. at 443 (“Evenhanded local 
regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public interest is valid unless preempted by federal action, 
or unduly burdensome on maritime activities or interstate commerce.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 22. Huron Portland Cement, 362 U.S. at 440–41. 
 23. Pike, 397 U.S. at 138–40.  In 1964, Bruce Church, Inc. secured a lease to develop 6,400 
acres of previously uncultivated land in Arizona, spending upwards of $3,000,000 to do so.  Id.  
The company began growing cantaloupes on the newly-cultivated land in 1966, and it experienced 
great success; in the years that followed, they consistently yielded cantaloupes of superior quality.  
Id.  Due to their highly perishable nature, however, the fruits had to be harvested, packed, and 
shipped to market quickly before they spoiled.  Id.  The cantaloupes could only be processed in 
packing sheds, none of which were available in Arizona.  Id.  The company would therefore 
transport the cantaloupes 31 miles away to California, where the necessary packing sheds were 
located.  Id. 
  The challenged law, issued in 1968, would not let the company send the fruits out of state 
unless they were first packed in certain containers—a process that would require the use of the 
packing sheds located across state lines.  Since the company was already on a tight schedule to 
avoid crop spoilage, compliance would have ensured the loss of the entirety of that year’s harvest.  
Id.  The company, therefore, filed suit in federal court, seeking an injunction to enjoin enforcement 
of the law.  Id.  The district court found that the enforcement of the law would effectively force the 
company to construct new packing sheds for itself at or near its Arizona operation.  Id.  Building 
such new sheds would take months and would cost the company about $200,000.  Id.  With these 
facts in mind, the district court sided with the company and granted injunctive relief, finding the 
law to be unlawfully burdensome upon interstate commerce.  Id.  Arizona petitioned the United 
States Supreme Court for certiorari, which the Court granted.  Id. 
 24. Id. at 139–40. 
 25. Id. at 139. 
 26. Id. at 140. 
 27. Id. 
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prevent this loss.28  After granting certiorari and reviewing the case, the Supreme 
Court ultimately affirmed the district court,29 announcing a new rule in its 
opinion: 
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.  
If a legitimate local purpose is found, the question becomes one of 
degree.  And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of 
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on 
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate 
activities.30 
Since then, the test, dubbed the “Pike balancing test,” has played a major role 
in dormant Commerce Clause disputes. 
B. The Circuit Split: Two Takes on One Problem. 
As Supreme Court case law on Pike balancing has expanded, a circuit split 
has developed—and continued to widen—as to how to treat states’ assertions 
concerning their respective laws’ “putative benefits”31—the positive effects that 
will allegedly issue forth from a law or regulation.  Some circuits advocate a 
kind of “fig leaf legitimacy,” which takes states’ assertions about their laws at 
                                               
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 146. 
 30. Id. at 142 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
 31. Given the longevity of this particular circuit split, it is important to keep in mind the 
individual cases’ place in history (i.e., in what year the courts decided them), because not all of the 
circuits had the luxury of working with the same body of Supreme Court case law or guidance.  The 
cases used as examples herein span from as early as 1992 to as recent as 2008.  It should also be 
noted that the cases chosen for this discussion are not exhaustive; rather, these cases tend to 
exemplify the circuit split most definitively.  In a seminal law review article discussing putative 
benefits, the author, James D. Fox, argued that the Fourth and Sixth Circuits would also be among 
the circuits that use the more deferential approach.  See Fox, supra note 5, at 200–01.  Although 
the D.C. Circuit arguably also falls on this side of the controversy, it is not included in this analysis 
because D.C. is federal territory, and Pike itself stated that its general rule applied to “the validity 
of state statutes affecting interstate commerce[.]”  Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added); see also 
Electrolert Corp. v. Barry, 737 F.2d 110, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding a D.C. ban on the 
possession of radar detectors, reasoning that the court need not “inquire closely into the validity of 
the local government’s reasonable factual assumption[,]” because “the local government’s safety 
rationale [was] not ‘illusory’ or ‘nonexistent’”).  Interestingly, one of the judges who decided Barry 
would end up on the Supreme Court a few short years later: Antonin Scalia. 
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face value.32  Others require the states to put forward meaningful proof of the 
economic or other benefits that they claim their laws will induce.33 
1. The First Approach: Fig Leaf Legitimacy. 
The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits employ fig leaf legitimacy—the 
more deferential approach toward states’ local interests in cases that have 
employed Pike balancing. 
In 2005, in Pharmaceutical Care Management Ass’n v. Rowe,34 the First 
Circuit addressed a challenge to a statute that—in an effort to control the costs 
of medicine and expand access to prescription drugs—placed regulations on 
(often out-of-state) pharmacy benefit managers who formed contracts with 
health benefit providers in Maine.35  Ultimately upholding the law, the First 
Circuit stated that “under Pike, it is the putative local benefits that matter.  It 
matters not whether these benefits actually come into being at the end of the 
day.”36  The First Circuit’s decision not to inquire into the effectiveness of the 
state’s law exemplifies the fig leaf legitimacy approach. 
Similarly, in its 2007 decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Abbott,37 the Fifth 
Circuit applied a form of fig leaf legitimacy and upheld a Texas statute designed 
to address potential conflicts of interest that companies such as Allstate (a 
Delaware company) had in serving both as insurers and as owners of automotive 
body shops in the state.38  The Fifth Circuit decided to defer to the legislature.39  
On the basis of Pike balancing, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “[a] reasonable 
legislator could have believed that [the law] would further legitimate interests in 
protecting consumers . . . .  That reasonable belief is enough to confirm that [the 
law] has at least putative local benefits.”40  Consequently, the court’s conclusion 
quintessentially embodied a fig leaf legitimacy approach. 
In 1992, in K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp.,41 the 
Seventh Circuit considered an extraterritoriality challenge to a Wisconsin law 
                                               
 32. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Albott, 495 F.3d 151, 164 (5th Cir. 2007); Pharm. Care 
Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 312–13 (1st Cir. 2005); Spoklie v. Montana, 411 F.3d 1051, 
1059 (9th Cir. 2005); K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
 33. See Leb. Farms Disposal, Inc. v. Cty. of Leb., 538 F.3d 241, 250–52 (3d Cir. 2008); Town 
of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 49–52 (2d Cir. 2007); R & M Oil & Supply, Inc. 
v. Saunders, 307 F.3d 731, 736–37 (8th Cir. 2002); Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1511–13 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 34. 429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 35. Id. at 298–99. 
 36. Id. at 313 (emphasis in original). 
 37. 495 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 38. Id. at 154–56. 
 39. Id. at 164. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 962 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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that barred price discrimination in sales of prescription medications.42  Believing 
the law to be constitutional, the court unambiguously commented: 
Nothing remains for analysis under the balancing procedure of Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc.  The dormant commerce clause does not call for 
proof of a law’s benefits . . . whenever the subject is trade.  On the 
contrary, legislation regulating economic affairs is within public 
power unless the rules are so silly that a justification cannot even be 
imagined.43 
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit also deferred to legislative decisions in Spoklie v. 
Montana44 when it performed the Pike test45 upon a Montana law designed to 
restrict the spread of chronic wasting disease among livestock.46  Among other 
things, the law forbade alternative livestock licensees from permitting the 
shooting—often by out-of-state hunters—of certain animals for fees on 
alternative livestock facilities.47  The court reasoned that the state was in no way 
required to prove that its judgment concerning its law’s putative benefits was in 
fact correct.48 
The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits’ take on putative benefits 
embodies the fig leaf legitimacy approach.  Other circuits, however, have used 
the alternative method. 
2. The Alternative Approach: Requiring Substantive Evidence. 
Unlike the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the Second, Third, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits have required substantive evidence from states concerning 
the efficacy of their judgments about their laws’ putative benefits. 
In 2007, in Town of Southold v. Town of East Hampton,49 the Second Circuit 
addressed a law that forbade ferry operators from docking certain classes of 
ferries within East Hampton limits, unless there was an emergency.50  The law, 
which was a local zoning ordinance, effectively barred the provision of all but 
passenger-only ferry services.51  The court remanded the case to the district court 
                                               
 42. Id. at 729–30. 
 43. Id. at 731.  Notably, in making this decision, the court expressed its belief that the law 
regulated only in-state commerce. Id. 
 44. 411 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 45. Id. at 1059.  To add further confusion to this Comment’s analysis, this case may have 
signaled a change in the Ninth Circuit’s approach to state putative benefits under a Pike balancing.  
See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 985 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a Commerce 
Clause challenge and upholding a city ordinance aimed at reducing airport noise, but only after 
examining if its provisions were, as the district court held, “arbitrary, capricious or unrelated to any 
governmental purpose”). 
 46. Spoklie, 411 F.3d at 1054. 
 47. Id. (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-4-414(2)). 
 48. Id. at 1059 (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)). 
 49. 477 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 50. Id. at 42. 
 51. Id. 
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for its failure to “engage in any meaningful examination of the claimed local 
benefits conferred by the Ferry Law” when applying the Pike test.52 
In 2008, in Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc. v. County of Lebanon,53 the Third 
Circuit examined a county flow control ordinance regulating the licensing of 
trash haulers and their methods and locations of disposal.54  Much of the issue 
was based on the transportation of waste across jurisdictional lines or to 
unapproved sites or facilities.55  The court remanded the case to the district court 
with orders to perform the Pike test and “make findings of fact and conclusions 
of law for the record[,]” which it deemed “incomplete regarding the burden on 
interstate commerce and, more importantly, the putative local benefits.”56 
Similarly, in a 2002 case, R & M Oil & Supply, Inc. v. Saunders,57 the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed a district court ruling enjoining enforcement of a Missouri 
statute that regulated the propane industry.58  Part of what made the matter 
significant in the first place was that the demand for propane naturally tends to 
spike in the winter.59  Missouri itself produces no propane, which forces it to 
import the good from other states that do.60  The crux of the controversy was the 
state’s claim that the anticipated propane supply shortages were its motivation 
for amending industry regulations, forcing bulk sellers of propane to maintain a 
storage capacity of at least 18,000 gallons within state lines.61  After invoking 
Pike, the Eighth Circuit questioned whether the statute would actually tend to 
halt propane shortages, “because the State presented no evidence to the district 
court that the propane storage capacity in existence before the passage of the 
statute was insufficient.”62 
Finally, in its 1994 decision in Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County 
Commissioners,63 the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s 
dismissal of an Alabama corporation’s challenge to an Oklahoma zoning 
                                               
 52. Id. at 52. 
 53. 538 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 54. Id. at 243–45.  This circuit, like the Ninth, may have altered its position on how to address 
putative benefits under a Pike test.  See Tolchin v. Sup. Ct., 111 F.3d 1099, 1102, 1109 (3d Cir. 
1997) (deeming constitutional a New Jersey Supreme Court rule that forced lawyers to comply with 
certain course requirements and maintain a “bona fide office” to practice law in the state because 
there was “a rational relationship . . . between the [particular] benefit of attorney accessibility and 
the bona fide office requirement” and “there [was] a satisfactory basis to find a rational relationship 
between the bona fide office requirement and the intended benefit of attorney accessibility”). 
 55. Leb. Farms Disposal, Inc., 538 F.3d at 244–45. 
 56. Id. at 252. 
 57. 307 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 58. Id. at 733. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 735. 
 63. 27 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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ordinance that regulated the conversion of hazardous waste fuels.64  The Tenth 
Circuit found that the district court applied the Pike test incorrectly, because it 
failed to consider “evidence that the Ordinance’s site requirements [were] 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits,” leaving unresolved “material 
fact issues[.]”65 
The Second, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ take on putative benefits, 
therefore, requires that states not only assert their laws’ benefits, but also submit 
substantive proof that those same benefits will materialize. 
C. So . . . Why Is This Circuit Split Yet Unresolved? 
The circuit split over the two major approaches to evaluating putative benefits 
in dormant Commerce Clause cases involves either great deference to state 
judgments (fig leaf legitimacy) or a demand for proof that a state law’s benefits 
are genuine (substantive evidence).  The question remains: Why has this circuit 
split persisted for so long?  The answer is twofold.  First, the amount of case law 
concerning the application of the Pike test has become so expansive, both at the 
Supreme Court and the circuit court levels, as to render the entire structure 
unstable, arbitrary, and arguably inconsistent in places.66  Second, the Supreme 
Court repeatedly turns away chances to resolve the split.67  For the time being, 
this difference of opinion among the circuits will persist into the foreseeable 
future.  So long as this split remains unresolved, companies and state 
governments will not be able to tell what laws will remain valid and enforceable 
and the reign of economic and regulatory uncertainty will continue. 
                                               
 64. Id. at 1501–02. 
 65. Id. at 1512. 
 66. Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Why the 
“Zone of Interests” Test Should Not Apply to Constitutional Cases, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 23, 28–29 
(2006); Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 417, 454–55 (2008); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 359 (James Madison) (A.B.A. 
2009) (commenting—albeit in the context of elected officials—that “[i]t will be of little avail to the 
people . . . if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot 
be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant 
changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow”). 
 67. See, e.g., Brown v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 367–68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 558 U.S. 1048 
(2009) (upholding Maryland’s “Morticians Act”—a state law that placed restrictions on corporate 
and unlicensed individual ownership of funeral establishments—against a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge).  This case seems to indicate a fig leaf legitimacy approach on the part of the 
Fourth Circuit.  Id. at 367. 
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II. PEEKING BEHIND THE CURTAIN: EXPLORING THE CIRCUITS’ RATIONALE68 
A. Analyzing the Fig Leaf Legitimacy Circuits’ Reasoning. 
The fig leaf legitimacy circuits tend to appeal to pieces of Supreme Court 
guidance that have similar themes.  For instance, the First Circuit based its 
position of deference regarding putative benefits on Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence in the plurality opinion of Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways 
Corp.69  The Fifth Circuit did the same.70  Placing such a critical portion of their 
analyses on a concurring opinion—rather than on the main opinion—of a case 
is, at minimum, potentially problematic for these circuits. 
The Seventh Circuit also attempted to justify its deference to the legislature, 
making reference to a string of Supreme Court cases.71  These supporting 
                                               
 68. Before embarking on this journey, it might be prudent to address a few concerns and forge 
the path that this Comment will take.  To start, some are of the opinion that not only the Pike test, 
but also the dormant Commerce Clause as a whole, is anathema to the constitutional structure.  See, 
e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“The fundamental problem with our negative Commerce Clause cases is that the Constitution does 
not contain a negative Commerce Clause.  It contains only a Commerce Clause.”).  There may not 
be a true dichotomy in the circuit split in question—that is, it may not necessarily be that one must 
choose between the two approaches presented above.  There is a third option. 
  Indeed, the ideal third option might be to abandon the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
entirely and to leave it to Congress to assess what instances of states’ regulation of interstate 
commerce are permissible.  Although this idea is originalist, it is itself, ironically, hardly “original.”  
Its advocates are members of an ever-growing chorus calling for the abandonment of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce 
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L. J. 569 (1987); Amy M. 
Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1215 (1994); 
Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy Doctrine Out of Its Misery, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1745 (1991).  Nevertheless, things cannot change overnight.  As a practical matter, therefore, the 
ensuing examination of the circuit split will attempt to identify which of the approaches has a better 
foundation in the law as it currently stands.  As a final caveat, it is important to emphasize just how 
narrow the focus of this Comment is and how scarce the sources upon which it is forced to draw 
are.  The Pike test, being a child of the common law, can only be studied via the use of cases.  Most 
positions that people seek to hold concerning Pike must find their foundations built on Supreme 
Court precedent.  Even then, the cases cited herein spare but a few sentences on their treatment of 
putative local benefits. 
 69. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 312–13 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Kassel 
v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that 
courts ought not “second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of 
legislation”)). 
 70. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 164 (5th Cir. 2007).  A potential problem with 
the Fifth Circuit’s citations here is that they failed to note that they were drawing from Brennan’s 
concurrence at all.  See id. at 164 n.49, 164 n.50. 
 71. K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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Supreme Court cases all indicate support for deference to Congress over matters 
clearly under federal control.72  Those cases do not support deference to states.73 
The Ninth Circuit’s pithy support for its position may be the most structurally 
sound.  Although it relied exclusively on one case for support in the relevant 
passage from its decision, the cited case was Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co.74—a United States Supreme Court case that stated outright: “States are not 
required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative 
judgments.”75  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s position is strengthened because 
the Court in Clover Leaf made this statement in the context of a discussion of 
whether there was an empirical connection between the ordinance under scrutiny 
and the reasons that the legislature provided for its enactment.76 
Given the preceding analysis, it appears that the fig leaf legitimacy circuits do 
not have an overall airtight case for their position, as there are several problems 
with it.  How do the substantive evidence circuits compare? 
B. Analyzing the Substantive Evidence Circuits’ Reasoning. 
The average reader may believe that the substantive evidence circuits have a 
more solid base of authority upon which to build.  If that is so, these circuits do 
not appear to have made full use of that authority.  In the boldest example from 
this side of the dispute, the Eighth Circuit did not cite to a single source in 
support of its position aside from its references to the exact statute in question.77  
It merely made its declaration and moved on.78 
                                               
 72. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 168, 179 (1980) (concerning Congress’s 
restructuring the railroad retirement system and benefits classifications); Vance v. Bradley, 440 
U.S. 93, 94–95, 110–12 (1979) (concerning Congress’s forcing certain federal employees into 
retirement at age 60); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S 1, 5, 49 (1976) (concerning 
certain provisions in Congress’s amendment—called The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972—of 
Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969), superseded by statute. 
 73. In what can only be deemed either subtle genius or a stroke of sheer luck, the final case 
in the string cite referenced appears to support the Seventh Circuit’s assertion on this count through 
a constitutional game of telephone.  The final case that the circuit cited, Northside Sanitary Landfill, 
Inc. v. Indianapolis, through a chain of case references, lends some support.  See K-S Pharmacies, 
962 F.2d at 731 (citing Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Indianapolis, 902 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 
1990) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (invoking and 
quoting Vance, 440 U.S. at 111))).  Although the quote from Vance concerned deference to the 
federal legislature, the context in which Clover Leaf used it seemed to incorporate it in order to 
endorse deference to state legislatures. 
 74. 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
 75. Id. at 464. 
 76. Id. at 463–64. 
 77. R & M Oil & Supply, Inc. v. Saunders, 307 F.3d 731, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2002) (taking a 
full two paragraphs to lay out its stance on the putative local benefits of the statute without using a 
single case citation, either from the Supreme Court or its own precedent).  There is a touch of irony 
here in that while the state was not allowed to make an assertion about a law’s putative benefits 
without evidence or support, the court did exactly that in its opinion.  Id. 
 78. Id. 
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The Second Circuit largely relied on its own prior law.  While the Second 
Circuit acknowledged that it should not sit in judgment over the wisdom of 
legislative policy judgments,79 it automatically countered—using its own 
precedent—that “courts . . . must be wary of granting summary judgment when 
conflicting expert reports are presented[.]”80 
The Tenth Circuit rested much of its argument upon the plurality opinion in 
Kassel.81  The district court had found that the ordinance in question fell under 
the state’s power to protect the health and safety of its residents,82 which the 
Supreme Court has long recognized as a valid exercise of the states’ police 
power.83  However, the Tenth circuit stated that the simple “incantation of a 
purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from 
Commerce Clause attack.  Regulations designed for that salutary purpose 
nevertheless may further the purpose so marginally, and interfere with 
commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.”84  
What jeopardizes this circuit’s approach is that the quoted source in no way 
seems to instruct courts as to how to treat states’ assertions of their laws’ putative 
benefits.  It comments more on the nature of the balancing itself.85 
Finally, the Third Circuit was remarkably thorough in its attempt to establish 
that the grounds on which it based its reasoning were solid.  In dealing with the 
waste flow control ordinance in question, the court made extensive use of the 
                                               
 
 79. Town of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 52 (2d Cir. 2007).  The 
proposition upon which the Second Circuit based this point is, in fact, from the Supreme Court.  
However, what is more surprising is that the circuit tried to override or at least sidestep it in its next 
citation, which happened to be from its own precedent. 
 80. Id. (citing Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2002)).  
The circuit proceeded to cite to itself again when attempting to justify its decision not to accept at 
face value a law’s proposed benefits when a credible expert affidavit challenged them.  Id.  
(referencing Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602, 612–13 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 81. Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 82. Id.  
 83. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (stating that “[a]ccording to settled 
principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations 
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and public safety”); 
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 251 (1829) (stating that “[m]easures 
calculated to produce these objects [referring to enhancing property value and “the health of the 
inhabitants”], provided they do not come into collision with the powers of the general government, 
are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to the states”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 205 
(1824) (stating, in the scope of a larger commentary, that it is an “acknowledged power of a State, 
to provide for the health of its citizens”).  See also CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & ALLAN IDES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: NATIONAL POWER AND FEDERALISM 377 (6th ed. 2013). 
 84. Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 1512 (quoting Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 
U.S. 662, 670 (1981)). 
 85. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670.  To the Tenth Circuit’s credit, however, it appears to be the 
only circuit—of the ones studied herein at least—that, when invoking Kassel in its discussions of 
putative state or local benefits, cites to the main opinion itself rather than merely to Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence.  Id. 
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Supreme Court case United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Management Authority.86  While Part I and Parts II.A–C of United Haulers 
garnered a five-Justice majority, Part II.D was only a four-Justice plurality.87  
The Third Circuit went to great lengths to shore up its support for its reliance 
upon Part II.D of United Haulers.88  Its remand came “with instructions to apply 
the Pike balancing test in accordance with Part II.D of United Haulers.”89  The 
effort to rely on Part II.D appears to have been in vain, however.  That section 
of the opinion largely concerned a discussion about the burden side of the Pike 
balancing equation.90 
With this analysis of the reasoning of the substantive evidence circuits now 
complete, it appears that these circuits’ approach also has its share of issues.  It 
should be increasingly clear why the Pike test has generated so much discord: 
not only has the Supreme Court granted little explicit guidance, but also the 
respective circuits’ jurisprudence on the matter has thrown gas on an open flame. 
III. MAKING THE CASE FOR THE MORE DEFERENTIAL APPROACH 
A. The Root of All Evil: Failing to Distinguish the Steps of a Multi-Step 
Process. 
A recurring theme in many of the cases that employ the Pike test is a failure 
to focus on the correct segment of the test that is pertinent to the issue at hand.91  
                                               
 86. 550 U.S. 330 (2007).  See Leb. Farms Disposal, Inc. v. Cty. of Leb., 538 F.3d 241, 247–
52 (3d Cir. 2008) (relying heavily upon United Haulers). 
 87. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334. 
 88. Leb. Farms Disposal, Inc., 538 F.3d at 247–48.  The Third Circuit used various citations 
in this part of the opinion, arguing that “the plurality’s conclusion in Part II.D is both the narrowest 
of the opinions and the common denominator of the Court’s resulting opinion, thus representing 
the holding of the Court.”  Id. at 248. 
 89. Id. at 252. 
 90. See generally United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 346–47.  The bulk of the discovery done on 
remand concerned whether the ordinances in question imposed a burden on interstate commerce at 
all.  “After years of discovery, both the Magistrate Judge and the District Court could not detect 
any disparate impact on out-of-state as opposed to in-state businesses.”  Id. at 346 (emphasis in 
original).  If anything, the Court seemed to operate under a presumption of validity of the putative 
state benefits.  “We find it unnecessary to decide whether the ordinances impose any incidental 
burden on interstate commerce because any arguable burden does not exceed the public benefits of 
the ordinances.”  Id.  Even in the body of the opinion that garnered a majority, the Court commented 
on the case’s procedural history, noting that 
[o]n remand and after protracted discovery, a Magistrate Judge and the District Court 
found that the haulers did not show that the ordinances imposed any cognizable burden 
on interstate commerce.  The Second Circuit affirmed, assuming that the laws exacted 
some toll on interstate commerce, but finding any possible burden ‘modest’ compared to 
the ‘clear and substantial’ benefits of the ordinances. 
Id. at 337–38 (quoting United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 438 
F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2006)).  See also United Haulers, 438 F.3d at 153–56 (detailing the 
background of the dispute as a whole). 
 91. Fox, supra note 5, at 177. 
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This is not an attack on the judges who handle the cases, but rather a commentary 
on the complexity of the Pike test.  It is of the utmost importance that people 
understand the test’s nature and structure. 
The test has several parts.  Step 1 is to find out whether to apply Pike.92  The 
court must discern whether “the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest”93—that is, whether the statute is 
discriminatory.94  This step is to establish whether the court will need to use the 
scales of a Pike balancing at all.  The court will also take note of any other glaring 
constitutional issues, such as a state attempting to engage in extraterritorial 
regulation.95  If the law is non-discriminatory—and part of this determination is 
whether the statute has a rational relationship with its end96—and does not suffer 
from an extraterritoriality concern, then the Pike test becomes relevant.97 
Step 2 of the Pike analysis has two parts.  It entails deciding what the burdens 
(Part 1) and benefits (Part 2) of the state law in question are.  Essentially, the 
decision is what to place on the scales.98  Step 3 is to perform the actual 
balancing itself.99 
The courts’ failure to use singular language when handling Pike balancing 
cases is a major problem plaguing this debate.100  This may also be the reason 
                                               
 92. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (quoting Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) and defining “discrimination” in the appropriate context).  
See generally Jennifer L. Larsen, Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. 
REV. 844 (2003/2004) (giving insightful commentary on the various types of discrimination).  If a 
statute is in fact discriminatory against out-of-state businesses, etc., the courts almost always deem 
it per se unconstitutional.  To date, only once has the Supreme Court upheld an outright 
discriminatory state law that burdened interstate commerce in this manner.  See Maine v. Taylor, 
477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (deeming constitutional—because it was the least restrictive effective 
means available—a state statute that barred importation of out-of-state baitfish in an attempt to 
prevent infestation by particular parasites). 
 95. DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 272 (2004).  
“Identifying extraterritoriality problems is a tricky business because states seldom regulate 
activities with no intrastate attributes whatsoever; rather, constitutional difficulties arise when 
regulations that address local concerns have ripple effects on how firms conduct business in other 
jurisdictions.”  Id. 
 96. MAY & IDES, supra note 83, at 380. 
 97. Id. at 381, 393. 
 98. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.  This is the decision of exactly what is “the burden imposed on 
[interstate] commerce” and “the putative local benefits,” respectively.  Id. 
 99. This is the determination of whether the burden “is clearly excessive in relation to” the 
benefits.  See id. 
 100. Fox states: 
The plethora of words and phrases employed by the courts when analyzing state benefits 
tempts one to compare Pike balancing cases to a tower . . . of Babel.  The Supreme Court 
has never defined “putative state benefits” nor has it developed a single analytical 
standard for the state benefits side of the scale.  In analyzing state benefits lower courts 
have used all kinds of phrases such as: “state benefits,” “putative state benefits,” 
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why many of the circuits appear to have a near-total disunity of thought on the 
matter.  When they attempt to support their positions, there is a risk that they 
will not even necessarily focus on the correct “step” in the Pike test.  If one uses 
the suggested labeling, this particular circuit split concerns a divergence only 
over Step 2, Part 2 of a Pike balancing.101 
B. Separating the Wheat from the Chaff.102 
To establish that the fig leaf legitimacy circuits have a better basis in the law 
for their position, it is best not only to examine those cases upon which they have 
(or could have) drawn, but also to distinguish those which might support their 
opposition. 
1. The “Problem” Cases . . . Or Are They? 
Among the cases that some might cite as examples of the Supreme Court 
taking a stricter position toward putative state benefits103 is the Supreme Court’s 
1978 decision in Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice.104  Rice 
concerned a Wisconsin regulation governing the length of transport trucks that 
operated within state boundaries, barring any truck longer than fifty-five feet, 
and forbidding the towing of more than one trailer at a time without a permit.105  
Wisconsin largely phrased the regulation in terms that made it a highway safety 
statute.106  Ultimately, the Court found the evidence in the case “so 
overwhelmingly one-sided” in favor of the argument that the regulations made 
only a “speculative contribution to highway safety” that it found the statute 
unconstitutional.107 
                                               
“advances” state benefits, “state purposes,” “rational safety measure,” “rationally 
furthers,” “plausibility of the tendered purpose,” “actual purpose,” “declared purposes,” 
“lawmaker’s purposes,” will not “second-guess” state legislatures, “not illusory,” and 
“post hoc justification.”  These phrases can mean the same thing, or very different things, 
and often defy simple classification using interstate Commerce Clause language. 
Fox, supra note 5, at 190. 
 101. While the described delineation of the steps in the Pike test is original, it appears at least 
somewhat to trace James D. Fox’s conceptualization.  See id. at 210. 
 102. In the name of intellectual honesty, an assortment of the most pertinent Supreme Court 
cases follows, and not merely those cases cherry-picked to bolster the “pro-fig leaf legitimacy” 
position that this Comment espouses.  It is prudent to evaluate many of the cases that courts—as 
well as lawyers and fellow scholars—tend to cite most commonly.  Even those cases that seem at 
first glance not to support the position of this Comment may be helpful in resolving the circuit split 
in question. 
 103. See Fox, supra note 5, at 195–97 (identifying what the author claims are several “rational 
relationship ‘with bite’ cases”). 
 104. 434 U.S. 429 (1978); see Fox, supra note 5, at 195–96 (discussing Rice). 
 105. Rice, 434 U.S. at 432–33. 
 106. Id. at 433–34. 
 107. Id. at 447–48. 
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While some might think that the Court’s analysis in this case indicated a kind 
of “heightened rational basis test”108 in dealing with putative state benefits, that 
assertion is contestable.  The Court had to deal with some Step 1 Pike issues—
such as discrimination—to start.109  While the Court acknowledged that “those 
who would challenge state regulations said to promote highway safety must 
overcome a ‘strong presumption of [their] validity[,]’” 110 it found that many of 
the various exemptions that the state tended to grant when applying this 
regulation were discriminatory in effect, and one of them was outright 
discriminatory on its face.111  This certainly “weaken[ed] the presumption in 
favor of the validity of the general limit[.]”112  The Court, therefore, had reason 
to abandon its usual Step 1 deference to the state legislature concerning the law’s 
purpose. 
While the discriminatory portions of the law could have been considered 
sufficient cause to enforce a per se rule of invalidity, the Court still employed 
the Pike test.113  Nevertheless, it is difficult to say that Rice definitively 
employed a stricter standard once moving to Step 2 of the Pike analysis.  While 
one may advocate for a presumption of validity concerning a state law’s putative 
benefits, no one claims that the initial deference at this “step” is insurmountable. 
In Rice, the “appellants produced a massive array of evidence to disprove the 
State’s assertion that the regulations ma[d]e some contribution to highway 
safety[,]”114 while the state made the odd move of “virtually default[ing] in its 
defense of the regulations as a safety measure.”115  This effectively forced the 
Court to conclude that the putative benefits were not even credible.116  Had the 
state offered any evidence whatsoever, perhaps that would have been enough to 
keep the law’s measures within the scope of being “rationally related” to its 
purpose.  Because it did not, no one can ever really know.  The moral of the 
story here is that while the Court may give a state tremendous deference on its 
law’s putative benefits, a sure-fire way to withdraw that deference is to pass a 
law with discriminatory features and give the Court a “deer-in-the-headlights” 
look at trial.  That was how bad it had to be before the appellants could give the 
                                               
 108. Fox, supra note 5, at 196. 
 109. See Rice, 434 U.S. at 441. 
 110. Rice, 434 U.S. at 444 (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959)). 
 111. Id. at 446–47. 
 112. Id. at 447. 
 113. “[W]e cannot accept the State’s contention that the inquiry under the Commerce Clause 
is ended without a weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the degree of interference with 
interstate commerce.”  Id. at 443. 
 114. Id. at 444.  See also id. at 436–37 (detailing the evidence offered that challenged the 
benefits of the law).  To boot, the appellants also proffered voluminous evidence about the 
burdens—Step 2, Part 1—that the law would place on interstate commerce.  Id. at 438–39. 
 115. Id. at 444.  See also id. at 437–38 (commenting on the state’s failure to attempt to 
contradict the appellants’ evidence in any way). 
 116. See id. at 443–45. 
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Court everything it needed to tip the scales in their favor and show “the illusory 
nature of the safety interests[.]”117 
Another case that could conceivably be a thorn in the sides of the fig leaf 
legitimacy circuits is the 1982 case of Edgar v. MITE Corp.118  Edgar dealt with 
an Illinois law that commanded that “any takeover offer for the shares of a target 
company must be registered with the Secretary of State.”119  According to the 
state, the statute served “to protect resident security holders and . . . regulate[] 
the internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law.”120  Describing 
the benefits of the law as “speculative,” however,121 the Court found the statute 
unconstitutional under the Pike test.122 
Once again, however, the sentiment that this case signals that the Court 
“employ[ed a] rational basis ‘with bite’ scrutiny”123 and therefore took a less 
deferential position concerning state putative benefits is not necessarily true.  
One issue to raise is that the statute had a “sweeping extraterritorial effect”124 
due to the fact that it regulated “transactions which [took] place across state 
lines, even if wholly outside the State of Illinois.”125  This would already place 
the law in jeopardy at the Step 1 stage.  Admittedly, this portion of the analysis 
fell into Part V-A of the opinion, which was not part of the opinion of the 
Court.126 
However, Part V-B, which was part of the Court’s opinion, dealt with the Pike 
test and the examination of the state benefits.127  In response to the claim that the 
law protected local investors, the Court simply observed that “the State ha[d] no 
legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders.  Insofar as the Illinois 
law burden[ed] out-of-state transactions [referring back to its extraterritorial 
effects], there [was] nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law.”128  
That is, while the state claimed that it was acting to support a local interest, the 
benefit here was to persons outside its jurisdiction.129 
                                               
 117. Id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 118. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).  See Fox, supra note 5, at 196 (discussing Edgar). 
 119. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 626–27. 
 120. Id. at 644. 
 121. Id. at 645. 
 122. Id. at 646. 
 123. Fox, supra note 5, at 196. 
 124. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642. 
 125. Id. at 641 (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. at 626.  This was a remarkably fractured opinion, as only Parts I (the case history), II 
(deciding that the case was not moot), and V-B were the “opinion of the Court.” 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 644 (emphasis added). 
 129. The Court used similar reasoning to reject the state’s contention that it had “an interest in 
regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws.”  Id. at 645.  The Court 
stated: 
Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and do not 
themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company.  Furthermore, the 
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As a final distinction, the Illinois law in question would, as a matter of fact 
(and law), not be what would bring about many of the alleged benefits because 
a federal statute (the Williams Act)130 “provide[d the] same substantive 
protections,”131 which, again, would be more of a Step 1 issue for a Pike 
analysis.132  However, concerning those benefits that the Illinois law provided 
that went above and beyond the Williams Act,133 the Court agreed with the 
Seventh Circuit (from which the case arose) that “the possible benefits of the 
potential delays required by the Act may be outweighed by the increased risk 
that the tender offer will fail due to defensive tactics employed by incumbent 
management.”134  Even if one were to assume that this particular part of the 
Court’s analysis served to call the state’s assertion of benefits into question, that 
was the only portion of the law that seemed to have any substantive value 
concerning the benefits side of a Pike balancing—and, therefore, the law was 
likely to fail that test anyway by this point.  Perhaps due to this and the 
extraterritoriality concerns, the Court had little trouble icing the cake with a 
declaration that the benefits were speculative to boot.135 
2. Pillars of Support for the Fig Leaf Circuits. 
In 1987, “[t]he holding of Edgar was somewhat limited . . . by CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of America.”136  The facts underlying CTS Corp.137 were 
remarkably similar to those in Edgar,138 yet the Court reached a different result, 
ultimately reversing the lower court and upholding the Indiana statute in 
                                               
proposed justification is somewhat incredible since the Illinois Act applies to tender 
offers for any corporation for which 10% of the outstanding shares are held by Illinois 
residents[.]  The Act thus applies to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and 
have their principal place of business in other States.  Illinois has no interest in regulating 
the internal affairs of foreign corporations. 
Id. at 645–46 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 130. See generally id. at 632–34 (detailing the content and intent of the Williams Act, passed 
in 1968). 
 131. Id. at 644. 
 132. The odd thing to note here is that, in this particular respect, while the law itself might not 
have been “preempted,” it seems in a sense that its benefits were.  That is, when one speaks of 
preemption, he usually imagines a scenario in which a federal law and a state law are in conflict.  
Here, the laws were substantively similar in many ways.  As such, one could argue that the form of 
“preemption” here was unique, insofar as the state law served more as a legal redundancy of sorts 
because its alleged benefits were already provided by a federal statute. 
 133. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. William Lee Biddle, State Regulation of the Internet: Where Does the Balance of 
Federalist Power Lie?, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 161, 179 (2000). 
 137. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 138. Compare Edgar, 457 U.S. at 626–30, with CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 72–78 (dealing with a 
similar law and tracing an analysis through the issues of preemption, a Commerce Clause challenge, 
and the “internal affairs” doctrine). 
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question.139  To start, “[t]he difference with the Illinois law in Edgar was that 
Indiana’s law applied only to companies incorporated in the State[,]”140 and “the 
Williams Act [did] not pre-empt the Indiana Act.”141  The Court also found that 
the Act did not discriminate against interstate commerce.142  The statute, 
therefore, cruised right past Step 1 of a Pike analysis. 
Further, while addressing the Commerce Clause challenge to the law—the 
point where the lower court had employed the Pike test143—the Supreme Court 
took a distinctly libertarian stance.  It decided not to question Indiana’s approach 
to regulating tender offers for corporations or whether benefits would definitely 
issue forth from them.144  It also notably incorporated Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence in Kassel, saying—in the context of the law’s benefits—that the 
Court was not inclined “to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers 
concerning the utility of legislation[.]”145 
Finally, the 1981 decision in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.146 likely 
mirrors the fig leaf legitimacy circuits’ reasoning most closely.  The case 
revolved around a law that forbade the sale of milk in nonreturnable plastic 
containers while allowing its sale in nonreturnable paperboard cartons.147  The 
purpose of the statute was to manage the state’s solid waste management 
problem.148 
A six-member majority of the Supreme Court first concluded—while 
examining the equal protection portion of the challenge to the law—that the 
state’s purpose was legitimate—something on which the parties themselves 
agreed.149  The Court decided that the ban on plastic milk containers was also 
rationally related to the state’s purpose,150 despite the lower court’s finding that 
“plastic milk jugs in fact take up less space in landfills and present fewer solid 
                                               
 139. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 94. 
 140. Biddle, supra note 136, at 180. 
 141. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 87. 
 142. Id. at 88. 
 143. Id. at 77. 
 144. See generally id. at 91–92 (using phrases such as “[a] change of management may have 
important effects on the shareholders’ interests[,]” “[t]he autonomy provided by allowing 
shareholders collectively to determine whether the takeover is advantageous to their interests may 
be especially beneficial where a hostile tender offer may coerce shareholders into tendering their 
shares[,]” and “the potentially coercive aspects of tender offers have been recognized by the SEC” 
(emphasis added)). 
 145. Id. at 92 (quoting Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 146. 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
 147. Id. at 458. 
 148. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 458–59.  In an amusing historical twist, the Minnesota 
state legislature ended up repealing the statute in controversy in this case—section 116F.22, as 
section 116F.21 was the statement of policy—just a few short months after the Court issued its 
opinion that ultimately upheld it.  See 1981 MINN. LAWS, ch. 151, § 2. 
 149. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 461–62. 
 150. Id. at 470. 
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waste disposal problems than do paperboard containers.”151  The Supreme Court 
commented that while the legislation may not have been “a sensible means of 
conserving energy[,]”152 it was nevertheless the legislature’s decision to 
make.153 
Moving into the Commerce Clause portion of the challenge to the law, the 
Court further concluded that it was not discriminatory154—thus passing, in every 
way, Step 1 of a Pike analysis.  In a surprisingly brief summary of its position 
on the law’s putative benefits—Step 2, Part 2155—the Court said that the law’s 
burdens on interstate commerce were 
not “clearly excessive” in light of the substantial state interest in 
promoting conservation of energy and other natural resources and 
easing solid waste disposal problems, which we have already 
reviewed in the context of equal protection analysis.  We find these 
local benefits ample to support Minnesota’s decision under the 
Commerce Clause.156 
That is, although the law’s benefits were at best debatable, they were sufficient 
for purposes of a Pike test. 
C. So, What Can We Glean? 
Although not exhaustive, these cases help to illustrate a few general rules 
concerning the treatment of putative benefits in a Pike analysis and should help 
resolve this circuit split. 
For one, while there are various terms and words used to refer to putative 
benefits, it is best to draw the critical distinction between a law’s purpose—a 
Step 1 concern that might end up making a true Pike balancing unnecessary—
and its benefits—a Step 2, Part 2 concern where Pike’s scales are actually 
employed.  A law’s “purpose” might be defined in this context as its 
“classification or type.”157  The “purpose” of the law must be a constitutionally 
valid one—usually one of traditional local concern—and a presumption of 
validity will stand unless it in fact violates constitutional principles. 
                                               
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 469. 
 153. Id. (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963)). 
 154. Id. at 471–72. 
 155. The Court performed its “burden” analysis—Step 2, Part 1—in the immediately preceding 
portion of its opinion, deeming the burdens on interstate commerce to be relatively minor.  Id. at 
472–73. 
 156. Id. at 473 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 157. The purpose of a law is often somewhat difficult to distinguish from its benefits simply 
because the latter tends to serve the former—at least for laws that are well-crafted and more likely 
to survive Pike balancing.  Perhaps it would be better to conceptualize a law’s “purpose” as the 
“genus” of benefits that it aims to induce, whereas the “benefits” are more of a “species” (to borrow 
some scientific and philosophical terminology from Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas). 
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In contradistinction, “putative benefits” could be defined as “those rationally-
related positive effects that a law seeks to induce in service of a legally legitimate 
purpose.”158  Whether those effects come to fruition is irrelevant.  So long as (1) 
there is a rational relationship between the asserted positive effects of the law 
and a legitimate purpose, and (2) the alleged benefits do not pass into the realm 
of the outright laughable—either in themselves or via an extreme amount of 
uncontroverted, voluminous, and convincing evidence that contradicts them—
the court will consider the benefits at face value.  To be clear, however, a court 
will not consider those benefits that arise from the pursuit of an illegitimate 
purpose or the use of unconstitutional means (i.e., from laws that are 
discriminatory, seek to regulate extraterritorially, etc.), as they are not, properly 
speaking, “benefits” within the definition above. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At this point in time, if the Supreme Court is not going to abandon the Pike 
test in its entirety, it is time that the Court resolved this circuit split.  States could 
then finally know exactly what is expected of them when their laws are 
challenged in court and businesses and their employees could thrive in stable 
markets.  While neither the fig leaf legitimacy approach nor the substantive 
evidence approach is perfect, the fig leaf legitimacy circuits have a stronger case 
in the law for their position on putative state benefits. 
To return to where this Comment started, perhaps it would be best to make 
one last observation about Lady Justice before closing.  Although her depiction 
is nearly ubiquitous, there is one small detail about her that almost no one 
notices. 
She is not smiling.  Perhaps now she can. 
 
                                               
 158. These definitions are entirely original.  Any similarity to other definitions is unintentional 
and purely coincidental. 
